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Rainfall variability and groundwater availability for irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa: evidence from the Niayes region of Senegal  Amy Faye1, Siwa Msangi2  
 Abstract  
Recent research on climate change, within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, has shown the vulnerability of groundwater resources to climate change and variability. In Senegal, agriculture is among the most important users of groundwater resources, especially in the northern coastal area called ‘Niayes’ where farmers practice irrigated agriculture and use almost exclusively the quarternary sand aquifer for their irrigation needs during the dry season – which is the main growing period. However, in Senegal, irrigated agriculture, particularly that of horticultural crops, mostly grown in the Niayes, has attracted less research attention in terms of studies focused on climate change or variability, compared to staple-growing rainfed regions. In the Niayes region, farmers grow most of Senegal’s horticultural production. Combined with human use of water resources, climate variability may threaten future irrigation water availability in the area.  This paper uses an integrated hydroeconomic model and a rainfall generator to evaluate the impact of rainfall variability on irrigation water availability and simulate its implications on producers’ responses and groundwater management policy measures.  Results show that groundwater availability is diminishing over time, resulting in higher water table depth and smaller water withdrawals by farmers who will tend to decrease the area allocated to crops and favor the higher-valued crops. These trends are accelerated under a drier climate regime. A taxation policy to stabilize the aquifer would induce a reduction of the area under cultivation and have negative implications on revenues. Supply-side measures to enhance recharge may not be technically or financially feasible. This suggests that Senegal needs to develop groundwater management options that favor sustainable use of agricultural water resources without hindering national horticultural production.    Key Words: Agriculture; irrigation; rainfall variability; hydro-economic modeling; groundwater management; Senegal. 
                                                 1 Researcher at the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research. Email : amy.faye1@gmail.com 2 Senior researcher. Email: siwamsangi@gmail.com 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Ground and surface water resources are vulnerable to climate change and variability as 2 well as extreme events (Kumar, 2012; Booker, 1995; Tanaka et al., 2006; Bates et al., 2008 ; 3 ...). In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) groundwater constitutes an important source of consumptive 4 water use in most countries. However, despite its importance and changing climate conditions 5 in the region, there has been historically little interest in analyzing the impact of climate 6 change and/or variability on groundwater availability (Taylor, Koussis and Tindimugaya, 7 2009). The conference on « Groundwater and climate in Africa »3 held in Kampala (Uganda) 8 in June 2008 has been the first one on these issues in Africa (Taylor, Koussis and 9 Tindimugaya, 2009). Since then, there has been a growing number of scientific publications 10 on interactions between groundwater and climate related changes (see Taylor, Koussis and 11 Tindimugaya, 2009; Nyenje and Batelaan, 2009 for examples).  12 Agriculture is one of the biggest users of groundwater resources along with domestic and 13 industrial sectors. However, in SSA, climate related studies on groundwater resources have 14 mostly focused on the resource (see examples in Hughes et al., 2015) and not sufficiently on 15 the implications of climate shocks on agricultural production and producers’ responses. Most 16 of the studies have focused on modeling hydrological aspects without an explicit integration 17 of user behavior (e.g. Nyenje and Batelaan, 2009). Indeed, by considering water demand as a 18 fixed amount, hydrological models fail to capture the economic value of water (see Harou et 19 al., 2009) and do not fully account for users’ response to groundwater availability under 20 climate change and variability. On the other hand, studies focusing on climate impact on 21 agriculture have extensively focused on rainfed agriculture (Roudier et al., 2011; Roudier, 22 2012; Jalloh et al., 2013; Sultan and Gaetani, 2016), mostly due to its widespread practice 23 compared to irrigated agriculture that only constitutes less than 5% of arable land in SSA 24 (Giordano, 2006). They have therefore not sufficiently studied the interactions between 25 climate and irrigated agriculture.  26 This situation is observed in West African countries like Senegal, where, almost all the 27 studies on climate impact on agriculture have been oriented towards staple crops in rainfed 28 regions (P Roudier et al., 2014; Sene, Diop, & Dieng, 2006) with a poor focus on irrigated 29 crops like horticultural ones mostly grown in the coastal area called Niayes that represents 30 one of the two main agroecological zones of irrigated agriculture in Senegal. In the Niayes, 31 farmers almost exclusively use the quaternary sand aquifer for irrigation and are impacted by 32 rainfall variability mainly through groundwater availability as shown by previous climate 33 related studies in the region (Aguiar, Garneau, Lézine, & Maugis, 2010; Dasylva & 34 Cosandey, 2005). Those hydrological and geographical researches have been interested in 35 how past climate have affected the aquifer and generally point out a negative effect of climate 36 on aquifer recharge and depth (Aguiar et al., 2010; Dasylva and Cosandey, 2005). However, 37 little effort has been done towards assessing the future impact of rainfall variability on water 38 resources in the area and how changes in physical variables might affect horticultural 39 production, farmers’ revenues and their responses as well as the implications for groundwater 40 management.  41 This paper aims at filling this gap by developing an integrated hydroeconomic model 42 (HEM) that allows to analyze the impact of climate variability on irrigation water availability 43 and its implications on production and agricultural water management in the Niayes area of 44 Senegal. The ability of integrated hydroeconomic models to do such analyses has been shown 45 in Western countries (Medellín-Azuara, Howitt and Lund, 2010; Blanco-Gutiérrez, Varela-46 Ortega and Purkey, 2013; Howitt et al., 2012; Varela-Ortega et al., 2016; Esteve et al., 2015; 47 ...) and some SSA countries (see You and Ringler, 2010; Robinson, Willenbockel and 48                                                  3http://www.gwclim.org/ 
Page 3  
Strzepek, 2012 for examples in Ethiopia). In West African countries such as Senegal, to date, 49 there has been no application of HEM to assess climate change or variability impact and 50 adaptation on agricultural water resources despite their suitability for this type of analysis.  51 The objectives of the paper are threefold : (1) to assess the effect of rainfall variability on 52 aquifer levels; (2) to assess the implications on farmers’ water extractions and cropping 53 pattern; (3) to analyze different water management instruments, namely, the imposition of a 54 volumetric water tax (demand-side instrument).  55 Our integrated hydroeconomic model is mostly composed of a hydroeconomic component 56 representing aquifer dynamics and groundwater use behavior, a bioeconomic model to derive 57 agricultural water demand reflecting the economic value of water. To this combination, we 58 associate a stochastic annual rainfall generator.  59 In the next section, we present the study area focusing on agricultural activities, the 60 characteristics of the aquifer under study as well as the climate in the region. In section 3, we 61 describe our methodology. Section 4 describes the data we used. Section 5 discusses key 62 results and alternative policy interventions while discussing their implications. In section 6, 63 we discuss the results in light with the body of literature on the issue. Lastly, section 7 64 concludes the paper and discusses research perspectives for better policy design based on 65 identified limitations of the study.  66 
2. AGRICULTURE, GROUNDWATER AND CLIMATE IN THE NIAYES AREA 67 
The Niayes area is the coastal zone located in the North-West of Senegal riding between 68 four administrative regions: Dakar, Thiès, Louga and Saint-Louis (see figure 1).  69 Agriculture is the main economic activity with two growing seasons, the rainy season that 70 goes from June to September with a minimum mean annual rainfalls of 138mm and a 71 maximum of 599mm in the period 1970-2011 and the dry season from October to May. Due 72 to low level of annual rainfalls, farmers specialize in irrigated agriculture during the dry 73 season that is the main growing season4 during which are grown most of horticultural crops in 74 Senegal. The Niayes is the main production area of horticultural crops with “half to two-thirds 75 of the national production of fresh vegetables” (Fare et al., 2017). Irrigated area covers 76 10000ha (J. Faye, Ba, Dieye, & Dansoko, 2007) with around 10000 horticultural producers 77 (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, 2013). In the Niayes, farmers use the 78 quaternary sand aquifer for irrigation needs, to which they access mostly through private 79 wells (shallow wells, dugwells and increasingly tubewells) by manual or mechanical 80 extraction (with motorized pumps)—(Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment, 2013). 81 There is a small proportion of farmers (less than 3%) in the South of the Niayes that access 82 water through the Senegalese water company (SONES). Therefore, water costs faced by the 83 farmer mostly reflects the cost associated with water extraction which is the energy cost of 84 pumping for farmers using mechanical extraction and investment cost for well construction. 85 More details on agricultural activity in the area can be found in Fare et al., (2017) who did an 86 extensive analysis of the agrarian system in the Niayes.  87 Concerning water resources management, it is under the responsibility of the direction of 88 management and planning of water resources (the DGPRE5) embodied in the  89 Ministry of hydraulics and sanitation. To date, very little is known about the agricultural 90 water withdrawals within the Niayes area given that the farmers’ private wells are currently 91 neither subject to effective control from the DGPRE nor under any significant regime of 92 community-level water resource management (to the best of our knowledge). However, there 93 does exist a water code designed in 1981 and according to which farmers extracting more than 94 
                                                 4 Due to climate change and variability, the duration of the seasons may be variable. 5 Direction de la gestion et de la planification des ressources en eau. 
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5m3 of ground water per hour should pay for the water they use up to 12.12Fcfa per cubic 95 meter. However, this pricing scheme has not been revised since 1980s. Therefore, the DGPRE 96 is currently undertaking studies to review this water pricing scheme and explore new 97 possibilities of water governance. We hope that this paper will contribute to their pricing 98 analysis, as well as to the larger debate around the appropriate type of water resource 99 management regime to impose on the region. 100 The quaternary sand aquifer is an unconfined aquifer that covers a surface of 2300km2 101 (Aguiar et al., 2010). It is mainly recharged by rainwater infiltration (Aguiar et al., 2010; 102 Dasylva and Cosandey, 2005). However, since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, rainfall 103 levels have remained below the levels reached during wet periods (before 1970s). On average, 104 rainfall has decreased from 500 mm in the 1932-1960 decades (Ndong, 1995) to 321.42 mm 105 in the period 1970-1990 and 353.67 mm in the period 1990-2011. 106 Therefore, if warming trends and (more importantly) lower rainfall levels persist, the 107 groundwater recharge may decrease and lead to declines in the available stock of 108 groundwater. This might be exacerbated by growing extractions due to predicted warmer 109 temperatures (Jalloh et al., 2013) in Senegal that will tend to increase the evapotranspiration 110 of crops and, therefore, induce greater demand for irrigation water. In addition, the aquifer is 111 used by other actors like industries, the Senegalese Water Company6, the entity that extracts 112 and distributes water to some industries and rural households via boreholes. This raises 113 concerns about irrigation water availability under different climate outcomes and how the 114 agricultural sector can cope with a degrading resource base that is the primary production 115 factor for farmers in the Niayes region. 116 
 117 
Figure 1: The Niayes area of Senegal 118 Source: Realized by Dieye (2018)7 119 
3. AN INTEGRATED HYDROECONOMIC MODEL TO ASSESS GROUNDWATER 120 AVAILABILITY AND MANAGEMENT UNDER CLIMATE VARIABILITY 121  122 
                                                 6 This usage is applicable to the period during which the primary data was collected (in 2014). However, there may have been changes since then and the company’s withdrawals may have diminished over time.  7 Dieye is a geographer at the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research. 
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There is an extensive literature on the theoretical framework of common pool resources 123 (Burt, 1964, 1966, 1967; Kim et al., 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Koundouri, 2004). This has oriented 124 our understanding of the basic problem of agricultural groundwater use, before putting it 125 within the specific context of the Niayes region of Senegal. Empirically, economic modeling 126 of groundwater has been mainly done using integrated hydroeconomic models that are 127 extensively reviewed in Harou et al. (2009). There is a growing number of empirical studies 128 on water availability under climate change or variability and its implications on agriculture 129 and water management that use integrated hydroeconomic models (Medellín-Azuara, Howitt 130 and Lund, 2010; Blanco-Gutiérrez, Varela-Ortega and Purkey, 2013; Howitt et al., 2012; 131 Varela-Ortega et al., 2016; Esteve et al., 2015…). Based on this literature, we tailor the 132 integrated hydroeconomic modeling framework in Msangi and Cline (2016) to our area of 133 study and research objectives.  134 Integrated HEM are of two types: holistic or modular (R. Brouwer & Hofkes, 2008). 135 According to Brouwer and Hofkes (2008), the holistic approach consists of a single, 136 integrated model which allows for direct interaction between components, whereas the 137 modular or compartmentalized approach is comprised of stand-alone components which more 138 loosely interact, with simulation outputs from one component providing the inputs for another 139 one to use. In our case, unlike the holistic approach build in Msangi and Cline (2016), our 140 integrated HEM follows a modular approach (see Brouwer and Hofkes (2008) for more 141 details in modular and holistic approaches and Esteve et al.(2015) for an application of 142 modular approaches) which is composed of two stand-alone models: a hydroeconomic model 143 and a bioeconomic farm production model calibrated using the standard PMP approach 144 (Howitt, 1995). These models, implemented in GAMS, are run separately but communicate 145 via variable exchange with output variables from one model being input variables in another 146 model as we will later explain it in detail. To this set of models we associate a stochastic 147 rainfall generator inspired by Safouane et al. (2016). 148 The farm production model is run first to obtain the per hectare irrigation water demand 149 that reflects the implicit marginal value of water to the agricultural producer. This water 150 demand function is then transformed into a measure of producer benefit which becomes part 151 of the decision maker’s objective criterion within the hydroeconomic model. This latter 152 directly captures the groundwater management decisions and outcomes by combining the 153 economic benefit of water withdrawals (net of pumping costs) and the resulting aquifer 154 dynamics from period-to-period. We can choose between alternative management regimes in 155 which we can, in one case, account for just the immediate costs of pumping groundwater (the 156 myopic case) or, alternatively, we can also take into account the implicit ‘social’ user cost of 157 groundwater extraction, which captures the externalities a forward-looking decision-maker 158 would consider in a dynamically optimal resource management regime. The simulations from 159 this hydroeconomic model provides us with aggregate levels of water availability and 160 farmers’ groundwater use (aquifer level and withdrawals) over time, for the entire irrigated 161 area in the Niayes. Withdrawals are then re-scaled to per ha quantities and fed into the farm 162 model to evaluate the impact of different water availability levels on farmers’ net revenue and 163 their responses in terms cropping pattern. Finally, the solution of the (dynamically-optimal) 164 resource problem defines the benchmark for economic efficiency that we will use as a basis 165 for comparing alternative policy measures, in a later sub-section of the paper. The overall 166 framework that we use to capture the key linkages between the different models is captured in 167 Figure 2. In the following sub-sections, we describe the structure of the models and the results 168 from our scenario-based simulations.  169 
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 170 Figure 2: Model integration 171 Source: Authors  172 
3.1. Hydro-economic modeling framework 173 
 174 3.1.1. Aquifer dynamics and choice of a single reservoir  175 
In the Niayes area, we noticed spatial heterogeneity for parameters such as the infiltration 176 rate of rainfalls and the depth of the water table. As in Msangi and Cline (2016), the ideal 177 would be to divide the aquifer into several interconnected reservoirs to account for that 178 heterogeneity. However, we do not have the necessary data to estimate the connection 179 coefficients between sections of the aquifer nor do we have sufficient data on hydrological 180 parameters such as infiltration rates for the entire area. For this reason, we are constrained to 181 consider the aquifer as a single reservoir as illustrated in figure 3.  182 
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 183 
Figure 3: Aquifer dynamics 184 Source: Authors  185 
We capture aquifer dynamics by considering inflows (recharge) and outflows 186 (withdrawals from agricultural and non-agricultural users). Inflows are mainly represented by 187 rainfalls for which only a share ∝ infiltrates the soil as recharge. Indeed, due to factors such as 188 evaporation, soil characteristics, vegetation and others, not all the rain that falls goes to the 189 aquifer. In addition to inflows from rainfalls, we consider inflows from irrigation water 190 applied to crops which represents a share (β) of farmers’ withdrawals (ݓ௔௚). Therefore an 191 outflow for irrigation needs of wୟ୥ will result in a return to the aquifer of βwୟ୥. However, this 192 return rate is not available for our area of interest. Therefore, since studies have been 193 undertaken to evaluate the infiltration rate of rainfall (Gaye, 1990; Faye, 1995; El Faid, 1999; 194 Tine, 2004; Dasylva and Cosandey, 2005), we consider that the return to the aquifer β is equal 195 to the infiltration rate ∝. Sensitivity analyses are conducted in this paper to see how our 196 results vary according to some parameters, including the infiltration rate. Apart from 197 agricultural withdrawals, we account for non-agricultural users’ (water company and rural 198 populations through boreholes) water extractions (ݓ୒୭୬୅୥) for whom we do not consider any 199 return to the aquifer as it is primarily for potable water supply in urban areas and for domestic 200 water use in rural areas. We consider non-agricultural withdrawals as exogenous quantities in 201 our model.  202 The equation of motion that describes aquifer dynamics is written as follows: 203  204 
ݔ୲ାଵ =  ݔ୲ + ݓ௔௚ ∗ 10ିସܣݏ௬ −
∝ ݓ௔௚ ∗ 10ିସܣݏ௬ +
1
ܣݏ௬ ݓே௢௡஺௚ ∗ 10ିସ −
∝ P ∗ 10ିଷ
ݏ௬  (1)  205 Where ݔ୲ ܽ݊݀ ݔ୲ାଵ (in meters) correspond to the aquifer lift in the current and future periods 206 respectively. ܣ is the area covered by the aquifer. In order to avoid inconsistencies in the units 207 of the variables, we need to convert volumetric values (ݓ௔௚ and ݓே௢௡஺ ) into consistent units 208 of measure (i.e. meters) according to the following conversion rule: when we apply one 209 millimeter of water to a surface, it covers 10-3 m3 /m2 (C. Brouwer, Goffeau, & Heibloem, 210 1985). This means that each unit of m3/ha withdrawn from the aquifer leads to an increase of 211 the aquifer lift of 10-4m. This explains the division of withdrawals by the total area of the 212 aquifer and the multiplication by 10-4. We also multiply precipitation levels by 10ିଷ in order 213 to convert millimeters into meters. ݏ௬ is the specific yield, a coefficient that allows to account 214 
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for the amount of water released from the aquifer (see Johnson (1967) for a formal definition 215 of specific yield).  216 The economic benefits for groundwater can now be combined with the representation of 217 aquifer dynamics, to give a complete framework for looking at the impact of (economically-218 driven) groundwater extraction on the aquifer underlying the Niayes region. The overall 219 optimization problem that determines withdrawals over time can be either myopic or forward-220 looking in perspective, as we show in the following sub-sections. 221  222 3.1.2. Myopic optimization 223 
As explained in the literature (Gisser & Sánchez, 1980; Griffin, 2006; Knapp & Olson, 224 1995; Wang & Segarra, 2011), when it comes to economic modeling of groundwater, the 225 myopic behavior is a situation in which each agent maximizes its own profit to choose the 226 amount of water he/she withdraws without accounting for the availability of the resource in 227 the future and regardless of what the other agents will do. The maximization program in 228 equation (2) displays the myopic behavior in the case of one reservoir at the regional scale 229 (the Niayes region): 230  231 Max௪ೌ೒,೟൛ൣߨ൫ݔ௧ , ݓ௔௚,௧൯ = ܵ݅ݎݎܤ൫ݓ௔௚,௧൯ − ܥ൫ݓ௔௚,௧, ݔ௧൯൧ൟ      (2) 232 
S.t.  233 
ݔ୲ାଵ =  ݔ୲ + 10ିସ ((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)஺௦೤ − ∝୔౪ଵ଴
షయ
௦೤           (3) 234 
Where t corresponds to one period that we consider equal to a year. ܤ൫ݓ௔௚,௧൯ is the per 235 hectare benefit from extracting ݓ௔௚,௧  of water. ܵ݅ݎݎ is the total irrigated area in the Niayes.  236 The empirically-derived demand for water D(ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥) -- or, rather, its inverse ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥(ݓ) – 237 is used to obtain the benefit function for groundwater withdrawals 238 (i.e. ܤ(ݓ) = ׬ ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥(ݓ)݀ݓ). The Lagrange multiplier ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥ represents a representative 239 producer’s willingness to pay for one more unit of water which corresponds to the marginal 240 profit resulting from using one more unit of water.  241 
ܥ൫ݓ௔௚,௧, ݔ௧൯ = ݔ௧ ∗ c ∗ ݓ௔௚,௧  is the extraction cost of ݓ௔௚,௧  of water                                (4) 242 
c is derived from the first-order condition of the maximization program: 243  244 ߲ߨ(ݔ, ݓ) ߲ݓ⁄ = ܵ݅ݎݎ ∗ ߲ܤ(ݓ) ߲ݓ⁄ − ߲ܥ(ݓ, ݔ) ߲ݓ⁄ = 0  ܵ݅ݎݎ ∗ ߤݓఏ − ݔ ∗ c = 0          245 
C = ܵ݅ݎݎ ∗ ߤݓఏ ݔ⁄                                                    (5) 246 
where ߤ and ߠ are respectively the  constant and the elasticity of the demand function.                                                                                                         247 
      We do not observe farmers’ withdrawals (ݓ௔௚). To estimate them, we consider the per 248 hectare water  use in the farm model ∑ ݓ௝௝ ∑ ∝௝௝⁄  (see data section for more information on 249 the water use data by the representative farm) that we multiply by the total irrigated area in 250 the Niayes (Sirr).  251 
ݓ௔௚ = ܵ݅ݎݎ ∗ ∑ ݓ௝௝ ∑ ∝௝௝⁄ ==>  c =  ܵ݅ݎݎ ∗ ఓ(ௌ௜௥௥∗∑ ௪ೕೕ ∑ ∝ೕೕൗ )ഇ௫                              (6) 252 
 253 
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3.1.3. Dynamic optimization 254 
In this case, the net present value of current and future net benefits from groundwater 255 extractions are maximized at the regional level as in the following program:  256  257 
ܸ(ݔ) = Max௪ೌ೒,೟
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ߨ൫ݔ௧ , ݓ௔௚,௧൯ + δV(ݔ௧ାଵ)ݏ. ݐ.
ݔ୲ାଵ =  ݔ୲ + 10ିସ ((1 −∝)ݓ௔௚,௧ + ݓே௢௡஺௚)ܣݏ௬ −
∝ P୲ ∗ 10ିଷݏ௬ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ 
 
(7) 
 258 Where, ߜ is the discount rate. The other terms of this maximization problem have the same 259 meaning as in the myopic case. To solve this dynamic problem, we use a Chebychev 260 polynomial to approximate the infinite-horizon, carry-over value function of the Bellman 261 equation (Howitt, Msangi, Reynaud, & Knapp, 2002; Hubbard & Saglam, n.d.).    262  263 3.2. The farm model to derive the demand for groundwater 264 
Different methods of deriving agricultural water demand exist as describes Graveline 265 (2016) in his review on water programming models. In summary, econometric and 266 programming methods are the most used to derive irrigation water demand by agricultural 267 economists (Graveline, 2016). Econometric methods consist of establishing a relationship 268 between observed water consumption and data on the perceived cost of water (Bontemps & 269 Couture, 2002). In our case, we could not get accurate data on producers’ water consumption 270 and, consequently, were compelled to use an alternative approach. Mathematical 271 programming models capture the water usage behavior of a representative farmer maximizing 272 his profit by making choices over the optimal combination of productivity-enhancing inputs – 273 which include water. The profit depends on the cost of inputs and the revenues from 274 production. Those revenues depend on i) crop yields represented by an explicit production 275 function (Graveline, 2016) depicting the yield response to water, ii) the area allocated to crops 276 and iii) crop prices. Different types of production functions have been used to represent the 277 yield-water relationship as summarized in Graveline (2016). In our model, the choice of a 278 production function has been guided by the calibration process as we will explain later in this 279 sub-section. 280 Our farm model depicts a typical producer that maximizes its profit according to 281 neoclassical microeconomic theory. In the context of the Niayes, we assume that a 282 representative horticultural producer maximizes its profit ߨ from horticultural crops8 under 283 resource (land, labor and water) availability constraints as shown in equations 8 to 13.  284 
Max௭೔ೕ,ೢೕ ,௔ೕ൛ߨ = ∑ ൣ ௝ܽ൫ݕ௝൫ݓ௝൯ ∗ ݌௝൯ −  ൫∑ ݖ௜௝௜ ∗ ܿ௜௝൯൧௝ ൟ                                                  (8) 285   286 ∑ ௝ܽ௝ ≤ ܣ,   (ߣ௟௔௡ௗ )                                                         (9) 287 
∑ ݖ௙௔௠௟௔௕௝௝ ≤ ݐ݋ݐ݈݂݈ܾܽܽ݉ܽ,    ൫ߣ௙௔௠௟௔௕ ൯        (10) 288 
∑ ݖ௣௔௜ௗ௟௔௕௝௝ ≤ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݌݈ܾܽ݅݀ܽ,         ൫ߣ௣௔௜ௗ௟௔௕ ൯      (11) 289  290                                                  8 Although most small-holder farmers in Senegal are typical of other farm households in developing countries that subsist partially (or wholly) on what they produce on-farm – the horticultural growers in the Niayes are more commercialized and profit-oriented. Therefore we assume separability between the consumption and production decisions in the output market, and focus on the production side of the farmer’s problem.  
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 291 ∑ ݖ௜௝௝ ≤ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݅݊݌ݑݐ݅, ݅ ≠  (݂݈ܾ݆ܽ݉ܽ, ݌݈ܾ݆ܽ݅݀ܽ, ݓ),    (ߣ௜௡௣௨௧௦ )       (12) 292 
∑ ݓ௝ ≤௝ ݓ௔௚௧,     (ߣ௪௔௧௘௥)        (13) 293  294 Where, ࣊  is the profit of a representative producer ; ݆ represents crops (onion, carrot, 295 cabbage, sweet pepper, eggplant, african eggplant, tomato); ௝ܽ  represents the area allocated to 296 crop j ; ݕ௝  the production function of crop ݆ ; ݓ௝  is the amount of water applied to crop ݆ ; ݌௝ 297 is the price of crop ݆; ݅ is the index of inputs (mineral and organic fertilizer, pesticides, labor, 298 water); ݖ௜௝ represents the vector of input quantities; ܿ௜௝ is the vector of unit input cost except 299 water. Water cost is accounted for in the hydroeconomic model as we will explain below. 300 ܣ, ܺ ܽ݊݀ ܹcorrespond to the available quantities of key resources used in production. 301 Equations (9) to (12) represent land availability constraint, family labor constraint, paid 302 labor constraint, other inputs constraint (mineral and organic fertilizer, pesticides). Input 303 constraints are split into labor constraint (10 & 11) and other inputs constraint (12). Constraint 304 12 would apply to those inputs which are limited at the household/firm-level, such as labor – 305 whereas other inputs can be purchased freely on the market without any explicit rationing. For 306 family labor, it is considered as a resource available to the household which the farm does not 307 pay for. Equation (13) represents a constraint on available water, meaning that applied water 308 depends on available water ൫ܹ൯ from groundwater resources that correspond to farmers’ 309 withdrawals. In Mathematical Programming approaches, water can be explicitly priced (on a 310 volumetric basis) or else provisioned under a quantitative limit or at some extraction cost. The 311 extraction cost of water, integrated in our hydroeconomic model, is the only water-related cost 312 that we account for in the Niayes case as farmers mostly access water through private wells. 313 We calibrated the model to observed data by using the standard PMP approach of (Howitt, 314 1995). There is a comprehensive discussion on the standard PMP approach, its limitations and 315 subsequent developments that include supply elasticities in the calibration process in Heckelei 316 and Britz (2005) and Graveline (2016). In our case, the choice of the standard approach is 317 justified by i) the lack of data on supply elasticities for the crops we consider. Concerning the 318 yield function, we calibrated the model with a Mitscherlich-Baule specification as stated in 319 Rosenzweig et al. (1999) who used the Mitscherlich-Baule relationship in the case of two 320 inputs. In this paper, we use it for the single input case, i.e. water: 321 
ݕ௔ = ݕ௠(1 − ݁ݔ݌ିఉభ(ఉమାா்ೌ ))                  (14) 322  323 where yୟ and y୫ correspond to observed and maximum yields; ETୟ corresponds to water 324 applied to crops; βଶ is the soil residual water that we draw from the literature9 and βଵ is 325 computed as follows:  326 
ߚଵ = − ୪୬ (ଵି  ௬ೌ ௬೘⁄ )ఉమାா்ೌ                      (15) 327  328 The presence of y୫ allows the input-yield relationship to respect the "plateau" feature of Von 329 Liebig (Paris, 1992) – where a ‘ceiling’ on attainable yield is enforced, in accordance with 330 agronomic reality. 331 
The Lagrangian is written: 332 
                                                 9 See table B2 in the technical appendix. 
Page 11  
ܮ = ∑ ൣ ௝ܽ൫ݕ௝൫ݓ௝൯ ∗ ݌௝൯ −  ൫∑ ݖ௜௝௜ ∗ ܿ௜௝൯൧௝ − ߣ௟௔௡ௗ൫∑ ௝ܽ௝ − ܣ൯ −  ߣ௜ஷ௪௔௧௘௥൫∑ ݖ௜௝௝ −333 ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݅݊݌ݑݐ݅൯ − ߣ௪௔௧௘௥൫∑ ݓ௝ −௝ ഥܹ ൯                        (16) 334  335 First order conditions related to water input is: 336 
ࣔࡸ ࣔ࢝࢐⁄ = ࢇ࢐ ∗ ࢖࢐ ∗ ࣔ࢟࢐൫࢝࢐൯ ࣔ࢝࢐ൗ − ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥ = ૙ (17)  337 To derive the implicit ‘demand’ for water – we successively change the available water 338 ( ഥܹ ) on the right-hand side of the water constraint, and observe how the shadow value of 339 water (ࣅ௪௔௧௘௥) changes. This is empirically consistent with taking the derivative of the profit 340 function (π(p, c)) derived from the producer’s profit maximization problem, with respect to 341 the input price of water (ࢉ௪௔௧௘௥), in order to derive the input demand function, according to 342 Hotelling’s lemma ܦ(ࢉ௪௔௧௘௥)=− ߲ߨ(݌, ࢉ௪௔௧௘௥) ߲ࢉ௪௔௧௘௥⁄ . Given the fact that water is not 343 priced on the market as other purchased inputs are, and that the value must be derived 344 implicitly from the solution of the constrained producer’s overall optimization problem – our 345 approach provides an empirically tractable way to obtain a demand for water that is consistent 346 with the production technology and behavior that is observed in the data, and captured in our 347 model. As Booker et al. (2012) describe in their overview of empirical methods for modeling 348 water resource policy, this is a common approach when dealing with inputs not traded on 349 markets, and whose use are observed as the result of management decisions, rather than being 350 observed ex ante.  351 The inverse of the demand function in FCFA/ha per m3 is written: 352  353  ߣ௪௔௧௘௥(ݓ) =  8196.4ݓି଴.ସସଶ, so ߤ = 8196.4 and ߠ = −0.442                                         (18)                             354 
Therefore the benefit function is obtained as follow:  355  356 ܤ(ݓ) = ׬ ߣ௪௔௧௘௥(ݓ)݀ݓ          ܤ(ݓ) = ఓఏାଵ ݓఏାଵ      (19) 357 
3.3. Simulated scenarios: rainfall scenarios and adaptation scenarios  358 
We simulated two categories of scenarios: rainfall variability scenarios and adaptation 359 scenarios. The former are composed of a reference rainfall scenario, a dry rainfall scenario 360 and a wet rainfall scenario. Simulated climate scenarios are integrated into the hydroeconomic 361 model through the equation of motion (1) to capture climate variability effect. Since farmers 362 exclusively irrigate during the dry season using the quaternary sand aquifer, we assume that 363 horticultural production is affected by climate variability through water availability which is 364 captured within the hydroeconomic model. The farm production model captures the response 365 of farmers to changing water availability under climate variability.  366 Adaptation scenarios are composed of i) autonomous adaptation defined by Leary (1999) 367 as initiatives taken by private agents (here farmers) and ii) planned adaptation considered as 368 policy-driven according to Smit et al (2001).  369 Based on these two categories of scenarios, we defined three composite scenarios: 370 
a) A baseline scenario is composed of water availability (aquifer level) and groundwater use 371 (withdrawals), land use and cropping pattern. This baseline scenario is simulated under the 372 base rainfall scenario. 373 
b) An Autonomous adaptation scenario that represents farmers’ responses to water 374 availability under climate variability. Farmers’ responses are measured in terms of 375 
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groundwater use behavior (water withdrawals) and changes in cropping pattern. This 376 autonomous adaptation scenario is simulated in combination with the baseline and planned 377 adaptation scenarios under the dry and wet rainfall scenarios. 378 
c) A planned adaptation constitutes policy-driven water resources management scenarios. 379 Here we tested an economic-oriented instrument: the introduction of a volumetric tax to 380 motivate a reasonable use of the resource. This planned adaptation scenario is simulated under 381 the base rainfall scenario.  382 
In the following sub-sections, we will detail the methods used to build scenarios. 383 
3.3.1. Rainfall scenarios  384 
Inspired by Safouane et al. (2016), we developed a stochastic rainfall generator based on 385 Markov chains by using historical data for the period 1970-2011. Our methodological 386 approach can be declined in three steps as summarized in figure 4.  387 The first step is to classify the year types using the standardized precipitation index (SPI) 388 over 12 months (Mckee, Doesken, & Kleist, 1993) and rainfall data over the period 1970-389 2011. The advantage of using this index is its simplicity and the fact that it requires only 390 rainfall data. We used the SPI program developed by the National Drought Mitigation 391 Center10 for calculating the index. According to this index, the years are classified as 392 extremely humid, very humid, moderately humid, close to normal, moderately dry, very dry, 393 extremely dry. The second step consists of calculating the probability transition matrix that 394 reflects the probabilities of moving from one year type to another based on a first order 395 Markov chain. The third step consists of performing stochastic simulations using the 396 probability transition matrix.  397 Three scenarios are simulated over 42 years: i) a reference or base rainfall scenario which 398 transition matrix is derived from historical data; ii) a dry scenario obtained by using the 399 transition matrix of the base scenario with an increase of the transition probabilities of moving 400 to dry years; iii) a wet scenario using the transition matrix of the base scenario with an 401 increase in the transition probabilities of heading towards wet years. Although 42 years of 402 rainfalls were simulated, we only do the analyses over a period of 10 years. Indeed, as 403 suggested by Tanaka et al. (2006), long term studies should include changes in other variables 404 such as population change. Simulation results as well as a comparison of statistical properties 405 of simulated reference scenario and historical series are displayed in appendix C. 406  407 
                                                 10 http://drought.unl.edu/MonitoringTools/DownloadableSPIProgram.aspx, accessed in March 2015.   
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 408 
Figure 4 : Steps for rainfall scenarios development 409 Source: Authors  410  411 3.3.2. Adaptation scenarios 412 
Autonomous adaptation scenarios are endogenously accounted for in the different models. 413 Indeed, since the models are behavioral, we consider that when a shock is imposed on them, 414 the observed changes reflect farmers’ responses to those shocks.  415 As for planned adaptation scenarios, according to economic literature on groundwater 416 management (Griffin, 2006; Msangi & Cline, 2016; OECD, 2015; Ostrom, 1990), there are 417 different policy options (ranging from tax and quota policies to water markets and collective 418 management) to improve water availability in the long run for different users. Those policy 419 options can be undertaken on the demand side (extractions) or on the supply side (recharge) or 420 both of them. On the demand side, we tested, as stated previously, a tax policy on producers' 421 water extractions as they are the main users of the resource and discussed the other cited 422 management options. To estimate the tax, we introduced a tax parameter in the profit function 423 of the hydroeconomic model. We then simulated different levels of taxes until we found the 424 minimal level of volumetric tax from which the resource stabilizes over time. The following 425 equation (20) shows the profit function with the tax ߬:  426 
ߨ൫ݔ௧ , ݓ௔௚,௧൯ = ܵ݅ݎݎܤ൫ݓ௔௚,௧൯ − ܥ൫ݓ௔௚,௧, ݔ௧൯ − ߬ݓ௔௚,௧                                                  (20) 427  428 As for the supply side measures, we did not test any specific measure. However, we 429 computed the required annual additional recharge to stabilize the aquifer under the baseline 430 scenario. The additional recharge was calculated by adding to the equation of motion (1) a 431 “recharge” term that enables stabilization of the resource over time. We obtain the following 432 equation: 433 
ݔ୲ାଵ =  ݔ୲ + 10ିସ ((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)஺௦೤ − ∝୔౪∗ଵ଴
షయ
௦೤ + ܴ݁ܿℎܽݎ݃݁௧                                     (21) 434  435 The resource stabilizes when: 436 
ݔ୲ାଵ =  ݔ୲,      ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ݐ ==> ܴ݁ܿℎܽݎ݃݁௧ = ∝୔౪∗ଵ଴షయ௦೤ − 10ିସ ((ଵି∝)௪ೌ೒,೟ା௪ಿ೚೙ಲ೒)஺௦೤           (22) 437 
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 438 4. Data 439  440 4.1. Farm model data: sampling, descriptive statistics and justification of the choice a 441 representative farm  442 
4.1.1. Sampling 443 
Farm data was collected on a representative sample of 369 producers in the Niayes area in 444 2014. Producers were selected based on a two-stage stratified random sampling with two 445 sampling units: villages and producers. We first stratified the Niayes area into three sub-areas 446 based on physical differences to ensure that the sample will reflect the distribution of farmers 447 in the south, center and north of the Niayes area. Based on population data of the Niayes from 448 the National Agency of Statistics and Demography for the year 2012, we computed the share 449 of each strata in the total population. Using the sample size that was fixed to 40511 and the 450 previously computed shares, we derived the size of each strata in the sample. We then 451 sampled randomly 27 villages proportionally to the size of the strata. Finally, in each village, 452 we sampled randomly 15 producers.   453 
4.1.2. Sample characteristics and choice of a representative farm 454 
The data mainly contains information on-farm activities (cultivated crops, inputs 455 quantities and costs, revenues, labor) during the dry season and off-farm activities. The 456 sample contains 97.29% of men and 2.71% of women with an average size of 2.65 hectares. 457 The total irrigated area of the sample represents 10% of the total 10,000 hectares irrigated 458 area of the Niayes. The main activity is irrigated horticultural production with mostly 459 vegetables.  460 In the sample farmers are input-intensive with a broad use of mineral fertilizer (all 461 farmers), organic fertilizer and pesticides. Labor is composed of family and paid labor that 462 includes casual laborers and seasonal labor. The latter consists of “sourgas” hired on a 463 seasonal basis and paid either by profit sharing, monthly or seasonally. Casual laborers 464 constitute an additional source of labor that producers hire for specific farming operations 465 (often plowing, harvesting and sometimes sowing). They are paid on a flat rate or daily basis. 466 In this study, we consider only seasonal labor due to incorrectly measured data on casual 467 labor.  468 As for irrigation, farmers in the sample use the quaternary sand aquifer which they 469 primarily access through private wells. Other irrigation water sources include access through 470 the water company (SDE). Farmers using the water company are entirely located in the south 471 of the Niayes area (in the regions of Dakar and Thiès). Farmers extract water manually or 472 with motorized pumps. In the case of manual extraction, irrigation is done manually with 473 buckets or watering cans while in the case of mechanical/motorized extraction, irrigation is 474 manual or mechanic. In total, only 24% of the sample uses mechanical irrigation technics 475 among which 47% (which corresponds to 11% in the total sample) use drip irrigation, 5.62% 476 use sprinkler irrigation (which corresponds to 1.5% in the total sample) and other technics that 477 farmers did not report clearly. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample.  478 
 479 
                                                 11 Note that the realities of the field combined with filling errors in the questionnaires brought us back to a database of 369 producers. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the sample 480 
 Farm characteristics Values 
Lan
d use
 Average cultivated land per farm (hectares) 2.65 (sd 2.7)* Cropping pattern (% of farmers cultivating the crop) Onion (78.32), cabbage (45.26), tomato (41.19), sweet pepper (26), carrot (24.12), african eggplant (22), eggplant (22), pepper (9.49), potato (7.32)  Share of area per crop over all area   Total area of the sample (hectares) 1000  
Inp
ut a
nd 
labo
r 
Percent of farmers with family labor (unpaid)  96.48 Percent of of farmers hiring paid labor (%) Seasonal labor (66.12), temporary daily labor (59) Percent of farmers using inputs (%) Mineral fertilizer (100), Organic fertilizer (88.88), pesticides (96.47) 
Irri
gati
on a
nd 
extr
acti
on 
tech
nolo
gy 
Irrigation water sources (% of farms in the sample) Dug wells (81.84), shallow wells
12 (5.96), Tube wells (8.94), Water company (1.89), Others (3.52) Well lift (meters) Dug wells (8.04, sd 4.52) shallow wells (2.2, sd 0.70), Tube wells (10.38, sd 3.29) Water abstraction mode (% of farms in the sample) Manual (60.16), Motorized (33.06) with electric or fuel pumps, Mixed (6.78) Irrigation technologies (% of farms in the sample) Drip irrigation (11), sprinkler irrigation (1.5) Total observations 369 *sd: standard deviation 481 Source: Authors calculation 482  483 Although farms could have different characteristics along the Niayes, the data constraints 484 on physical parameters prevent us from developing different representative farms. Therefore, 485 we mainly consider one representative farm of the Niayes for modeling purposes. For the 486 representative farmer, we only consider crops that are cultivated by more than 10% of the 487 sample (see table 1). As for inputs, for each crop, we only consider inputs that are used by 488 more than 40% to 50% of the sample cultivating that crop. The same reasoning is applied to 489 labor. We could not obtain field-data on irrigation water use for the yield function of the farm 490 model. Therefore, we estimated it by using the Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) yield-water 491 relationship displayed in equation 23: 492 
(1 − ݕ௔ ݕ௠⁄ ) = ݇௬(1 − ܧ ௔ܶ ܧ ௠ܶ⁄ )                                                                                                   493 (23) 494 
Where, ݕ௔ , ݕ௠, ܧ ௔ܶ ܽ݊݀ ܧ ௠ܶ have the same meaning as previously defined for the yield 495 function. Based on this and knowing ݕ௔, ݕ௠ ܽ݊݀ ܧ ௠ܶ the quantity of water applied to each 496 crop (ܧ ௔ܶ) is obtained as follows : 497 
ࡱࢀࢇ =  ࡱ࢚࢓ ∗ (૚ − ࢟࢓ି࢟ࢇ࢟࢓∗࢑࢟ )                (24) 498 
Tables in appendix B1 indicate details on the data we used for the representative farmer and 499 for the parameters in equation 24. 500 
4.2. Hydro-economic model data 501 
                                                 12 Shallow wells are called « céane » in the Niayes and are considered as traditional shallow wells from which water can be abstracted manually using a bucket without any need to connect it to a rope (Cissé et al., 2001). 
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Hydroeconomic model data come from the literature and our own estimations. Data from 502 the literature is mainly data on hydrologic parameters (infiltration rate and specific yields) in 503 the area drawn mostly from doctoral theses undertaken by hydrologists and hydrogeologists 504 (Gaye, 1990; Faye, 1995; El Faid, 1999; Tine, 2004). Data on groundwater withdrawals from 505 the different agents, i.e. the Senegalese Water Company and rural borehole users, were 506 obtained from the direction of hydraulics of the Ministry of Hydraulics and Sanitation and the 507 Senegalese water company. As for farmers’ extractions, as detailed in the methodology 508 section, they were estimated using the estimated farm total water use and first order 509 conditions from the hydroeconomic model in the baseline scenario. Table B3 in appendix B 510 summarizes the parameters and data used for the hydroeconomic model and their sources. 511 Concerning data on aquifer lift, we consider the median value of all well-types lift (see table 512 2).   513 
Table 2: Aquifer lift data 514 
Well types Mean lift SD* Median Dug wells  8.04 4.52 7 shallow wells 2.2 0.70 2 Tube wells 10.38 3.29 12 Ensemble 6.87 2.83 7 *SD: standard deviation 515 Source: Authors calculation 516  517 4.3. Rainfall data 518 
We obtained rainfall data from the national meteorological agency of Senegal (ANACIM) 519 for the period 1970 to 2011 for the weather stations located in regions of Dakar, Thiès, Louga 520 and St-Louis.  521   522 
5. RESULTS  523 
In this section we present our results on climate variability impacts and adaptation options 524 on irrigated agriculture in the Niayes region of Senegal. The results are presented for five 525 selected variables: aquifer lift, water withdrawals, land use and cropping pattern, farm 526 income. The results for all these variables in the three defined scenarios (baseline, 527 autonomous and planned adaptation scenarios) are summarized in table 6. Before presenting 528 climate effect results, we found it important to first analyze the difference between the 529 dynamic and myopic cases as we expose it in the following sub-section. 530 
5.1. Comparing dynamic and myopic case results under the baseline scenario  531 
We find that there is a small difference in aquifer levels and water withdrawals when 532 moving from myopic to dynamic optimization cases although water availability is slightly 533 increased in the latter case. Compared to the myopic case, there is only 0.09% average 534 increase in the average cumulative present value of net benefits over the entire simulation 535 period in the dynamic optimization case (from 93,032 thousand Fcfa13 in the myopic case to 536 93,115 thousand Fcfa in the dynamic case).  537 
                                                 13 1USD=~562 FCFA 
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Empirically, this small difference between the myopic and dynamic cases is known as the 538 “Gisser and Sanchez” effect14 that has been subject to multiple critiques. Koundouri (2004) 539 suggests that this result depends on simplistic model specification and parameters such as the 540 infiltration rate, water demand elasticity. Its controversies were then supported by a number of 541 subsequent studies that have further refined hydro-economic models by taking into account 542 aspects such as environmental damage (e.g. Esteban and Albiac, 2011), by analyzing the 543 functional forms of the cost and net benefit from water extraction (e.g. Tomini, 2014) or by 544 integrating technological progress through endogenous irrigation techniques (Kim, Fuglie, 545 Wallander, & Wechsler, 2015). However, in our case some of the issues raised in those 546 studies could not be integrated due to scarce data that prevented us from integrating 547 ecosystem-level linkages to the groundwater hydrological flows in the Niayes region. Also, 548 we could not endogenize irrigation and water extraction techniques as the data allowing to do 549 so was not contained in the dataset, mostly the costs and benefits that would support farmers’ 550 decision to use such or such technology. The sensitivity analysis that we will perform will 551 help us temper this limitation.  552 Since the difference between the myopic and dynamic cases is not very important, the 553 results will mainly be presented in the myopic case except for the autonomous and planned 554 adaptation scenarios for which, results will be displayed for the dynamic case. The reason for 555 this choice is that since farmers’ water extractions are lower in the dynamic case, we prefer 556 using the latter to explore farmers’ responses in order to avoid any overestimation of 557 simulated adaptation strategies. 558 
5.2. Impact of climate variability on groundwater availability: aquifer lift  559 
To analyze the effect of rainfall variability on water availability, we compare the aquifer 560 level in the reference rainfall scenario to aquifer levels in alternative rainfall scenarios (dry 561 and wet) for the myopic case. Our results show that the drier the rainfall scenario considered, 562 the greater the aquifer lift over the simulation period. Therefore, in a dry scenario, irrigation 563 water availability is reduced and that effect is stronger when the drought is more severe. This 564 is better illustrated in figure 5 that also shows that climate effect exacerbates over the years. 565 Indeed, the difference in absolute value between the base scenario and alternative scenarios is 566 on average 0.02% in the beginning of the period from reference rainfall scenario to dry 567 scenario (respectively 0.1% from reference rainfall scenario to wet scenario) and 0.4% at the 568 end of the period from reference rainfall scenario to dry scenario (respectively 0.5% from 569 reference rainfall scenario to wet scenario). This suggests that considering a longer period 570 would have more stressed the effect of climate variability. Furthermore, we also observe an 571 upward trend in the depth of the aquifer over the 10-year period in the base and alternative 572 rainfall scenarios with an increase of aquifer depth of approximately 0.73 meters for the dry 573 scenario and 0.66 meters for the wet scenario compared to 0.69 meters for the reference 574 scenario. Thus, withdrawals seem to exceed the rainfall recharge even with precipitation 575 levels of about 500 mm on average over 10 years. We found that on average 13 millions of 576 cubic meters of annual recharge (in addition to recharge from rainfalls) is needed to stabilize 577 the aquifer over the simulation period in the baseline scenario. 578 
                                                 14 The “Gisser-Sanchez” effect refers to the conclusions reached by Gisser and Sanchez (1980) in their study of the Los Pecos basin, in which they stated that the gains to adopting centralized (optimal) management over myopic extraction of the groundwater resource were too small to justify any intervention.   
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 579  580 Figure 5: Comparison of aquifer lift under myopic extraction (dry, base and wet scenarios) 581 
Source: Authors  582 
5.3. Impact of climate variability and adaptation on water use behavior, cropping 583 pattern and farm income 584 
In the face of decreasing aquifer levels, farmers decrease their water extractions over the 585 years (see figure 6) with a decrease of 6 millions of cubic meters in the baseline scenario, 6.3 586 millions of cubic meters in the autonomous adaptation scenario with dry rainfalls and 5.8 587 millions of cubic meters in the autonomous adaptation scenario with wet rainfalls. As with the 588 depth of the water table, the difference (in absolute value) between the baseline scenario and 589 the other scenarios increases over the years, about 0.04% in the first year from the reference 590 scenario to the dry scenario (0.03% from the reference scenario to the wet scenario) and 1% in 591 the last year for both scenarios. 592 
 593 Figure 6: Comparison of farmers withdrawals under myopic extraction (dry base and wet scenarios) 594 
Source: Authors  595  596 Concerning land use and cropping pattern, results show that in general, as the resource 597 gets scarce, it is optimal for famers to decrease the area allocated to crops with slightly larger 598 decreases in the autonomous adaptation scenario under a drier rainfall regime. We find that 599 
6,600
6,800
7,000
7,200
7,400
7,600
7,800
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aqu
ifer
 lift
 (m
ete
rs)
Years
Aquifer lift dry scenario Aquifer lift base scenario Aquifer lift wet scenario
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Wit
hdr
awa
ls (m
illio
ns o
f cu
bic 
me
ters
)
Years
Producer withdrawals dry scenario Producer withdrawals base scenario
Producer withdrawals wet scenario
Page 19  
the area allocated to crops decreases more for crops with greater water requirements and 600 lower net returns like carrot compared to crops with higher net returns (even when they have 601 high water requirements) as shown in table 4. This drop in acreage results in a decrease in net 602 producer income with slight differences between scenarios (see table 6) over the 10-year 603 period.  604 These results suggest that the production of some horticultural crops (mostly low value 605 crops) could be reduced in the long run under climate variability. Therefore, policies should 606 incorporate better governance mechanisms for irrigation water resources to ensure their long-607 term availability for sustainable horticultural production in the Niayes. They should also 608 investigate the possibility to extend horticultural production in other areas to reduce the 609 pressure on water resources in the Niayes.  610 
5.4. Agricultural water management options: tested planned adaptation  611 
We tried a taxation policy to motivate farmers to preserve the resource by imposing 612 increasingly an ad valorem tax on producers’ water withdrawal. Taxes imposed vary between 613 0 (without tax) and 0.14 FCFA per cubic meter withdrawn. We find that the higher the level 614 of the tax, the lower the withdrawals and the lower the aquifer lift. The level of tax required to 615 stabilize the aquifer over time is greater than 0.1 FCFA per cubic meter. However, that would 616 lead to a substantial reduction in farmers’ withdrawals compared to the situation without tax. 617 As a consequence, farmers would decrease the area allocated to crops. For some crops more 618 than half of the initial area allocated is reduced as shown in table 4. This leads to a decrease in 619 farmers’ income of around 83% as shown in table 6. 620 
Table 3: Land use under different levels of water availability and under taxation 621 
Crops Simulated area  (t=115) 
%change area allocation between t=1 and t=10 in dynamic case without taxation %change area allocation between t=1 and t=10 in dynamic case under taxation (tax=0.1fcf/m3) 
Per hectar net return (x105fcfa/ha) 
Water requirements (mm/ha) 
Base scenario (~340,6mm/an) 
Dry scenario (~187mm/an) Wet scenario (~507) mm/an) 
Onion 0.73 -18.59 -19.08 -17.84 -67.41 16.69 703.2 
Carrot 0.51 -50.67 -51.41 -49.50 -98.10 8.05 1650 
Cabbage 0.46 -3.05 -3.12 -2.95 -6.29 11.96 607.2 
Sweet pepper 0.27 -5.44 -5.57 -5.25 -11.85 46.32 1201 Eggplant 0.40 -17.76 -18.23 -17.04 -63.55 16.80 1125.8 
African eggplant 0.41 -10.42 -10.67 -10.02 -26.20 23.28 1125.8 Tomato 0.46 -2.26 -2.31 -2.18 -4.54 10.15 451.5 
Source: Authors  622  623 Imposing such a tax requires having accurate information on the volume of groundwater 624 being pumped by farmers, which is not yet well-documented for the Niayes area. It would 625 also require that the revenue from the tax be redistributed to the farmers being charged in 626 lump-sum, in order to maintain their overall welfare and to keep the policy revenue-neutral. 627 The lack of information on producer’s pumping can prevent from imposing the right resource 628 
                                                 15 See calibration results in annex B to compare with observed values. 
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management strategy – including a quota on pumped water. Therefore, the first step towards 629 management should include rigorous measurement of farmers’ withdrawals from the aquifer. 630 More importantly, although being theoretically an option to manage groundwater resources, 631 the application of a taxation policy on producers’ side can lead – in the long term – to a 632 drastic decrease in horticultural production in the Niayes that supplies more than half of the 633 local market in horticultural products. This would neither be favorable to producers nor in line 634 with political ambitions in the horticultural sub-sector. Consequently, even though the 635 resource should be preserved over time, such a measure should be undertaken only if it allows 636 preserving the resource without offsetting farmers’ well-being. One of the venues would be to 637 look for alternative production areas. It might even be better to look more broadly at overall 638 water resource sustainability in Senegal (including surface water resources), and consider 639 ways of sustainably exploiting available surface and groundwater to expand irrigation so that 640 the country’s horticultural (and other non-horticultural) production needs can be maintained.  641 
Table 4 : Summary of results for the different scenarios and variables 642 
 643 Source: Authors  644  645 5.5. Sensitivity analysis 646 
In this section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on three parameters of the 647 hydroeconomic model: the infiltration rate, the discount factor, the elasticity of the demand 648 function to see how our results on water availability would change as a result of a change in 649 the value of those parameters. To avoid filling the paper with unnecessary figures and tables, 650 for each parameter, we only report the changes we observe.  651 Sensitivity analysis on rainwater infiltration rate has been done considering rates between 652 0.4% and 20%. The analysis shows that higher infiltration rates imply a more available 653 resource over time reflected by a lower aquifer lift and higher water withdrawals as shown in 654 figures 7 and 8. A higher infiltration rate also induces a higher difference in water availability 655 between wetter and drier situations.  656 
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 657 Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis—Aquifer lift under different levels of infiltration rate in the myopic case and baseline 658 scenario 659 
Source: Authors  660  661  662 
 663 Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis— producer withdrawals under different levels of infiltration rate in the myopic case and 664 baseline scenario 665 
Source: Authors  666 
As for the discount factor, we run the model with lower interest rates ranging from 6.5% 667 
to 2.5%; therefore, a higher discount factor ( ଵଵା௜). It is important to note that the myopic case 668 is not affected by a change in the discount factor due to the fact that the future is not 669 integrated in the myopic problem. We find that, farmers’ water extractions in the dynamic 670 case are smaller in all periods with lower interest rates as shown in figure 13. Thus, the 671 difference between myopic and dynamic cases becomes more important. This can be 672 explained by the fact that the higher the discount factor, the higher the present value of future 673 net revenues. As a result, farmers value the availability of the resource in the future and thus 674 decrease their withdrawals in the dynamic case which improves the availability of the 675 groundwater reflected in a lower aquifer lift with lower interest rates (see figure 9). We 676 further find that changes in the discount factor do not affect significantly the difference in 677 water availability between rainfall scenarios. 678 
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 679 
Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis--Aquifer lift under different levels of interest rate in the myopic case and baseline scenario 680 
Source: Authors  681  682 
 683 Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis— producer withdrawals under different levels of interest rate in the dynamic case and 684 baseline scenario 685 
Source: Authors  686 
Concerning the elasticity of the demand function, we imposed a lower elasticity of -0.15 687 and a higher elasticity of -0.80. We note that the more the demand is inelastic (the elasticity 688 tends to 0 in absolute value) the greater the difference between the withdrawals in the first and 689 last years (the decreasing trend in water availability remains unchanged) as shown in table 7. 690 
Table 5: Water withdrawals under elastic and inelastic demand 691 
 Water withdrawals with elastic demand (elasticity =-0.8) Water withdrawals with inelastic demand (elasticity =-0.15) Years Dynamic (x106 m3) Myopic (x106 m3) Dynamic (x106 m3) Myopic (x106 m3) 1 28.72 31.40 31.38 31.40 
2 28.32 30.89 28.81 28.83 
3 27.98 30.45 26.81 26.83 
4 27.64 30.01 25.06 25.08 
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5 27.33 29.61 23.65 23.66 
6 27.00 29.20 22.28 22.29 
7 26.68 28.80 21.05 21.06 
8 26.38 28.43 20.02 20.03 
9 26.10 28.08 19.16 19.16 
10 25.83 27.75 18.37 18.38 
Difference -2.88 -3.65 -13.01 -13.02 
Source: Authors  692  693 Overall, these sensitivity analyzes show that the choice of rainwater infiltration rate is an 694 important element in analyzing the effect of rainfall variability on the availability of 695 groundwater resources for irrigation in the Niayes. Indeed, the higher it is, the more the 696 difference between rainfall scenarios is important. The other elements (discount factor and 697 water demand elasticity) have a greater impact on producers' water withdrawal behavior and 698 so affect the depth of the aquifer; however, they do not affect much the differences in water 699 availability between rainfall scenarios nor the overall trend of results. These results confirm 700 the critiques of simulation-based analyses put forward by Koundouri (2004). 701  702 6. Discussion  703  704 6.1. Water availability under climate variability 705 
Our results on water availability under climate variability over time is consistent with 706 earlier literature in the Niayes. Aguiar et al. (2010) studied the interannual past evolution of 707 the quaternary sand aquifer between 1958 and 2002 and compared the evolution of aquifer 708 levels during wet periods (1958-1970) and during dry periods (from 1972) in some localities 709 of the Niayes. They found that the water table remained high during wet periods and observed 710 the most significant drops in water table during the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s.  711 Concerning the insufficient recharge, Dasylva and Cosandey (2005) analyzed the water 712 budget of the quaternary sand aquifer in the south of the Niayes (Dakar) under different 713 rainfall scenarios and showed that with a normal or deficit rainfall, the water balance is 714 negative and only becomes positive from excess rainfall averaging 700 mm per year. Thus, 715 they find that recharge from rainfalls is insufficient to ensure effective re-supply of the aquifer 716 when annual precipitations are lower than their levels during wet periods (before 1970). In our 717 case, we find that even in a wet scenario situation (about 507mm), the resource becomes more 718 scarce over time. 719 Regarding the magnitude of the increase of the aquifer lift over the ten years we 720 simulated, Aguiar et al. (2010) found that over the period 1958-1994, the water table fell by 721 nearly 0.51 meters on average every 10 years. In the same way, our results show that the 722 water table will continue to fall on average of the same amplitude or more depending on 723 rainfall levels over a given 10-years period. This decrease of the water table could have 724 implications on water quality. Indeed, with climate change, it is predicted on the coastal zone 725 of Senegal a sea level rise of 20 cm by 2030 and 80 cm by 2080 compared to a rise of only 3 726 cm between 1990 and 2010 (World Bank, 2014). An average continuous drop in the aquifer 727 level of 0.60 meters (60cm) over 10 years increases the risk of saline intrusion that would be 728 detrimental to horticultural production in the coastal Niayes.  729 Also, increasing aquifer lift can have implications on irrigation technology use. Indeed, as 730 argues Sekhri (2013, 2014) who studied water related issues in some Indian villages, as long 731 as the depth of the groundwater is not greater than 8 meters below ground, water can be 732 
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extracted  using surface pumps. However when the depth is more than 8 meters from the 733 surface, farmers need to use costlier submersible pumps for water extraction. 734  735 6.2. Farmers response to water availability 736 
Results on farmers’ autonomous adaptation to decreasing water availability are somehow 737 similar to other results in other contexts. We compare the results with studies in other contexts 738 because adaptation to aquifer availability in the Niayes area has been poorly studied. In India, 739 Sekhri (2013) analyzed the impact of a decline in groundwater and finds that a drop of one 740 meter of the water table over a year causes a drop in production, especially for more water 741 demanding crops. In the same way, in Spain, Esteve et al. (2015) used an integrated hydro-742 economic model for surface water and found that when available water decreases in the face 743 of climate change, producers change their cropping pattern and their income declines. 744 Moreover, Heidecke (2010) showed that (by analyzing survey data) in Morocco, when there is 745 water shortage due to groundwater decline, the main reaction of producers is to reduce the 746 area under cultivation. 747 It should be noted that the only strategies available for producers in our production model 748 are the reduction in area under cultivation and the change in cropping pattern (among crops 749 taken into account). These strategies, included here, assume that when water availability 750 decreases, producers limit themselves to the amount of water available and adapt accordingly. 751 For example a producer who grows one hectare of onion will not continue to cultivate one 752 hectare of onion when available water drops; but will cultivate an area that he/she can irrigate 753 with available water. However, based on our field experiences and literature (Heidecke, 2010; 754 Sekhri, 2014), in addition to strategies related to acreage decrease and changes in cropping 755 pattern, producers can also adopt other strategies that enable them to extract more water by 756 increasing their water pumping capacity and therefore continue to cultivate the same areas (or 757 even more) than before climate shock. For instance, Heidecke (2010) finds that another 758 
producers’ reaction is to increase the use of the aquifer for irrigation reflected by the increase 759 
in the number of motor pumps and the drop in phreatic levels in the years of drought.  760  Currently, our model does not allow for such adaptation strategies that require the 761 adoption of new water extraction technologies which can overestimate the impact on 762 agricultural production. However, these strategies could negatively affect net income because 763 they have implicit costs. This increasing cost will arise either from the increasing energy cost 764 of pumping groundwater from a lower depth and/or from the fact that a falling groundwater 765 table means that additional capital costs might need to be incurred in order to deepen the wells 766 or to install higher capacity pumps to access the water. It is therefore difficult to conclusively 767 state their possible impact on production without additional data on those costs. It should also 768 be remembered that some strategies that improve water access could, in turn, negatively affect 769 the groundwater resource and lead to increased water scarcity over time. Indeed, according to 770 (Berbel, Calatrava, & Garrido, 2007), “Investment in irrigation technologies has ambiguous 771 effects [...]. Negative effects result from the fact that changes in technology may induce new 772 crop patterns and increase total water consumption”. Also, integrating technological progress 773 would require allowing the possibility of endogenously adopting new extraction technologies 774 before choosing the amount of water to be extracted (given the chosen technology) which 775 induces a hydroeconomic model with two decision variables (technology adoption and water 776 extraction levels). These methodological limitations will be addressed in future work.  777  778 6.3. Planned adaptation results 779 
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Results on water pricing management strategy can be compared to what has been found in 780 the literature in other contexts. Indeed, (Aidam, 2015) did an analysis of the impact of price 781 mechanisms on the water demand for farmers in Ghana and showed, using the example of 782 large producers, that setting water prices leads to a decrease in the water consumption of 783 producers who reduce the production of high water demanding crops to cultivate crops that 784 require lower water consumption. This negatively affects producers' incomes. Also (Berbel & 785 Gomez-Limon, 2000) analyzed the impact of setting water prices in three irrigated areas in 786 Spain. They found that water prices as the only instrument to control water use is not a valid 787 instrument to reduce the demand for agricultural water in a significant way. Indeed, water 788 
consumption does not decrease until prices reach a level that significantly reduces producers’ 789 
income and labor use. They also found that, for the locations considered, when price 790 
mechanisms are used to reduce water consumption, a 40% reduction in producers’ income is 791 
required to drop water demand significantly which leads to a reduction in the number of 792 crops. Finally, when water consumption decreases as a result of substituting high water 793 demanding crops, there will be a decline in the utilization of the labor force at the farm level 794 and at the processing industry level. 795 These results are in line with what we found on taxation impact. However, in our results, 796 the decrease in farmers’ income is higher as discussed in the results section. 797 
7. Conclusions and research agenda 798 
This modeling framework is a first step towards a better representation of groundwater use 799 in a context of climate variability and change and multiple usage of the quaternary sand 800 aquifer in the Niayes area of Senegal where irrigated horticulture is the main agricultural 801 activity.  802 Modeling results show that under both myopic and forward-looking cases rainfall 803 variability affects water availability in the Niayes area. In the period 2014-2023, under 804 different rainfall scenarios, we found that the dryer the climate, the lower the groundwater 805 table resulting in farmers reducing their water withdrawals. Results also highlight low net 806 returns gains between myopic and dynamic optimization cases known as the Gisser and 807 Sanchez effect which could be explained here by the structure of the model that treats the 808 groundwater underlying the Niayes region as belonging to one big reservoir, rather than 809 several connected ‘compartments’. Also, we consider non-agricultural users’ withdrawals 810 exogenous which led us to only account for on-farm benefits while there are also off-farm 811 benefits that a social planner would consider. Therefore, further developments should be 812 performed to accurately endogenize non agricultural users’ behavior to see how it affects 813 results. Also, as develops Koundouri (2004), the choice of parameters such as the elasticity of 814 water demand, the infiltration rate is important in model design. Moreover, as suggests 815 Esteban and Albiac (2011), there might exist ecological and environmental aspects that also 816 affect groundwater availability that we are missing within our model specifications. We also 817 found that the resource is being depleted over time, in all climate scenario considered (even 818 though the effect is stronger in dryer scenarios) and whatever the degree of myopia or 819 foresight exercised by the decision-maker. This shows that rainfall recharge does not cover 820 water extractions that mostly come from farmers. Our model shows that an average additional 821 annul recharge of 13 million cubic meters is required to stabilize the aquifer over the 10 years 822 simulation period. 823 We further found that as a response to decreasing resource availability over time, in all the 824 scenarios considered, it is optimal for farmers to decrease the area allocated to crops by the 825 end of the considered period. Greater decreases of area are noted in a drought situation. Also, 826 
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crops with low returns and high water requirements are subject to greater area decreases. 827 Therefore, resource depletion might lead to significant decrease in irrigated area over time – 828 either due to the effect on pumping costs and accessibility or through the effects of saline 829 intrusion into the aquifer – which would threaten long-term horticultural production 830 sustainability in the Niayes.  831 To ensure sustainability of the resource, we tested a demand-side instrument, i.e. a 832 volumetric tax, as a resource management policy measure and found that the minimal level of 833 tax per cubic meter withdrawn required to stabilize the aquifer over time is 0.1fcfa. However, 834 such a taxation measure would lead to a drastic decrease of farmers’ withdrawals, area 835 allocated to crops and income. Ensuring resource sustainability being as important as meeting 836 demand on horticultural products, a tax on producers’ side should be carefully investigated so 837 as to avoid a drastic decrease in production in the long-run.  838 Different alternative demand options (a quota, water markets, collective action) and 839 supply side measures that we did not test exist. A quota-based policy would lead to the same 840 results (if successfully implemented) as the tax in terms of water extraction decreases. We did 841 not test it – recognizing that, as a tax, it would be difficult to administer in this region. 842 However, it should be noted that a quota may have less negative effects on producers' 843 incomes. In addition, empirical studies have shown that a tax could lead to more reluctance 844 from producers than a quota (Montginoul & Rinaudo, 2009). Concerning water markets, they 845 are feasible when users have well-defined property rights (Griffin, 2006) that they can 846 exchange in a market. This type of solution could also be difficult to generalize in the Niayes 847 context, given the type of management institutions that currently exist, and the absence of 848 efficient mechanisms for the producers to communicate their willingness to buy and sell 849 water. As for the possibility of engaging in the collective management of groundwater, we 850 cannot test it here because it requires taking into account the characteristics and interactions 851 between all the stakeholders and illustrating the bargaining possibilities that might lead to a 852 collectively cooperative outcome. Recent work in India by Meinzen-dick et al. (2017) 853 describes the applications of experimental games to explore the willingness to engage in 854 collective action with regards to the groundwater resource, and the effect that increasing 855 awareness of pumping externalities on the part of the players has on this willingness-to-856 engage. Such an approach would be useful in exploring the potential for organizing such an 857 institutional framework in the context of the Niayes, and will be considered for future work. 858 In the methodological approach chosen here, we treat the institutions as exogenous and focus 859 on the dynamics of depletion and the implications that it has on the agricultural economy.  860 Supply-side measures (like rainwater harvesting for aquifer recharge enhancement) can be 861 alternatives to demand-side measures or complement them. However, the difficulty that can 862 be encountered is related to the high investment costs and their affordability. Most likely, 863 external development aid and lending would have to be mobilized for this kind of scheme, 864 and should be part of the discussions with external donors on Senegal’s overall investment 865 strategy for the irrigation sector.    866 Finally, we noted several model limitations that included the non-integration of 867 technological progress (i.e. making irrigation and extraction technologies endogenous), which 868 prevented us from accounting for a broader range of adaptation strategies. However, these are 869 currently being investigated through a mixed-method approach (quantitative and qualitative 870 tools) through the use of forum-theatre that enables us to engage more dialogue with farmers 871 and enhance management options. Nonetheless, the modeling framework and the findings 872 from this study provide a basis for further research on climate impact on irrigation water 873 availability and agricultural water management in West African agriculture. 874 
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In this technical appendix, we explain in more detail (for the benefit of the reviewers and the 1199 interested readers) the specification of several key parts of the analytical framework – namely: 1200 a) The method for approximating the infinite-horizon, carry-over value function for the 1201 dynamic programming problem; 1202 b) Information on the data and the calibration of the farm model;  1203 c) Comparison of simulated and observed rainfalls 1204  1205 A. Complementary methodological material 1206 A1. Approximating the value function  1207  1208 To estimate the carry-over value function that defines the infinite-horizon dynamic 1209 programming resource management problem, we employ an approximation technique using 1210 an n-degree Chebychev polynomial. Such ‘projection methods’ for solving dynamic 1211 programming problems are described in (Judd, 1998).  1212 
There are a number of alternative approaches to numerically approximating the carry-over 1213 value function ܸ(ݔ௧)16 that is used to solve the infinite-horizon DP problem (as described in 1214 Judd (1998)). In our paper we use a numerical approximation method that uses a nth order 1215 Chebychev polynomial – which is one of several possible ‘orthogonal polynomial’ 1216 approximations that can be used (Judd, 1998).  1217 
In this approach, the function is evaluated over the domain of possible values that the state 1218 variable can attain, and is numerically computed at specific ‘nodes’ within the domain – 1219 whose number define the order of the polynomial approximation. These Chebychev nodes 1220 
                                                 16 Hubbard et Saglam (sd.) 
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provide the points from which the numerical value of carry-over into the next period of the 1221 dynamic programming problem can be interpolated to cover the entire domain of the value 1222 function. The number of nodes of approximation can be increased to any desired number in 1223 order to improve the numerical ‘fit’ of the value function – but at the cost of additional 1224 computational burden.  This is described further in (Howitt et al., 2002).  1225 
— Chebychev nodes 1226 
For m nodes, the kth node of the Chebychev function is written as: ݖ௞ = − ܿ݋ݏ (ߨ(2݇ −1227  1)/2 ݉), k = 1, ..., m, ݉ ≥  ݊ + 1. 1228  ݖ௞ falls within the closed interval [-1 , 1]. 1229 
We note that the values of the state variable do not necessarily fall within this restricted 1230 interval – but lie within a more general range of values [a , b] where a and b represent, 1231 respectively the minimum and maximum values of the state variable 1232 
The mapping of the nodes of the Chebychev polynomial ( kx ) from the interval [a,b] onto the 1233 [-1,+1] domain is done with this relationship :                                                                                1234 
ݖ௞  = ଶ(௫ೖି௔)௕ ି ௔ − 1  1235 
— The Chebychev polynomial terms 1236 
After having defined the nodes of the Chebychev polynomial, we then approximate the value 1237 function at defined nodes over the domain of the state variable, with the polynomial function, 1238 which is defined as : ܸ(ݔ) = ∑ ܽ௜Ф୧ (x)௜  1239 where 1240 ai is the coefficient of the  ith Chebychev polynomial term  1241 the polynomial terms can be written as: Ф୬  (ݔ)  =  ܿ݋ݏ (݊ ∗ cosିଵ(ݔ)) 1242 Using a recursive scheme, we can write out the terms of the Chebychev polynomial as: 1243 Ф଴  (ݔ)  =  1  1244 Фଵ  (ݔ)  =  ݔ  1245 Фଷ  (ݔ)  =  2 ∗ ݔ Фଶ  (ݔ)  −  Фଵ  (ݔ) 1246           1247 Ф୬  (ݔ)  =  2 ∗ ݔ Ф୬ିଵ (ݔ)  −  Ф୬ିଶ  (ݔ)   ݂݋ݎ ݊ ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ  1248  1249 
Over the interval  [− ܽ , ܾ],  ܽ௜ = ∑ ௏(௫ೖ)Ф౟ (୸ౡ)೙ೖసభ∑ Ф౟ (୸ౡ)Ф౟ (୸ౡ)೙ೖసభ  1250 
                                                       ܸ(ݔ) = ∑ ܽ௜Ф୧ (2 ୶ିୟୠିୟ −  1)௜   1251 Value function iteration                          1252 
Following this approach, we can solve the Bellman equation of the infinite-horizon dynamic 1253 programming problem by taking the following steps: 1254 i) Give an initial estimate of the carry-over value function that is defined on the right-hand 1255 side of the Bellman equation for the DP problem  1256  1257 ii) Calculate the left-hand side value of the Bellman equation using the mapping relationship  1258 ܸܶ (ݔ௞) =  ݂(ݔ௞, ܿ௞) +  ß ∑ ܸ (ݔ௞)௝    which depends upon the intial ‘guess’ of the carry over 1259 value V(x) that was done in the first step and the optimal value of the benefit function for the 1260 DP problem. This gives you a new value for V(x) using the contraction mapping V=TV which 1261 
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is applied to the next iteration, if the convergence of sequential estimates of V(x) to a stable 1262 value has not been achieved. 1263 iii) Verify if the difference|ܸܶ − ܸ| < ߝ, where ߝ ݅ݏ ݏݑ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐ݈ݕ ݏ݈݈݉ܽ   1264  If yes – then the infinite-horizon value function that defines the Bellman equation has 1265 been found 1266  If not, then we return to the step ii) and repeat the procedure until the condition 1267 described in iii) has been satisfied 1268 
In this approach, we rely upon the "contraction mapping theorem" to guarantee convergence 1269 to a stable value of V(x) for any initial guess. 1270  1271 B. Information on the data and the calibration of the farm model  1272  1273 B1. Farm model data 1274 
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Table B1: Farm production model data 
  Crops  African eggplant Eggplant Carrot Sweet pepper Tomato Cabbage Onion Cultivated area (ha) Mean 0.41 0.4 0.58 0.27 0.46 0.46 0.73 Median 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 Yields (kg/ha) Mean 10833 18045 12105 10010 10478 9948 10566 Median 7040 16000 9933 6100 6560 7178 9333 Crop prices (Fcfa /kg) Mean 243.64 117 115.01 489.59 121 148.91 239.31 Median 200 111.11 101.72 300 97.56 113.2 235 Seeds (kg /ha) Mean 0.22 0.26527 2.74789 0.19836 0.25559 0.56213 2.21061 Median 0.250 0.300 3.460 0.200 0.300 0.650 2.614 Seed cost (Fcfa /kg) Mean 108001 119001 23000 252001 230001 158000 55001 Median 100000 100000 24000 209000 160000 145001 58000 Mineral fertilizer (urea) (kg /ha) Mean 278.60 501.67 203.29 266.94 148.05 290.73 191.98 Median 120.92 248.25 84.96 180.03 109.42 108.51 95.38 Urea cost (Fcfa /kg) Mean 289.54 Median 280 Mineral fertilizer (10.10.20) (kg /ha) Mean 355.59 437.1 8 268.46 266.039 207.90 283.74 246.27 Median 195.28 372.38 118.94 180.03 109.42 108.51 136.26 Unit cost of 10.10.20 (Fcfa /kg) Mean 273.16 Median 250 Organic fertilizer (kg /ha) Mean 3267 4003 4399 2044 2776 1744 2394 Median 1292 1241 1639 1216 1055 1046 1362 Organic fertilizer cost (Fcfa /kg) Mean 33.67 Median 31.10 Herbicides  (l/ha) Mean 3.66 Median 2.72 Herbicides Cost (Fcfa/l) Mean 8002 Median 8000 Seasonal labor cost  Mean 138349 
Source: Authors 
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Table B2 : Additional parameters and data for the farm model 
 Parameter Value Source  Soil residual water 100mm Fall (2012) Farm model right hand side value of constraints 
Total area cultivated (A) 3.31ha  Totalfamilylabor 21 person/season Our data Totalpaidlabor 6.21 person/season Our data  
Table B3: Data from literature and research centers to calculate crop water use  
Crops Crop water requirements --ETm (m3/ha) Maximum Yields (࢟࢓)--(kg/ha) Yield response to water (࢑࢟) African eggplant 11258 50000 1,37 
Eggplant 11258 50000 1,37 
Carrot 16500 35000 0,82 
Sweet pepper 12010 50000 1,1 
Tomato 4515 50000 1,05 
Cabbage 6072 40000 0,95 
Onion 7032 35000 1,1 
Data source: Crop water requirements (from Senegal’s Center for the Development of Horticulture (CDH)) ; Maximum yields (from PADEN website17, we assumed a threshold of 50000 for the remaining crops due to lack of offically updated data). Yield response to water (from Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) for all crops except carrot from Carvalho et al. (2016) and eggplants from Lovelli et al. (2007)).   B2. Calibration results 
 Figure B1: PMP calibration results (area) 
Source: Authors                                                   17 PADEN is a project for the development of the Niayes region. It is a project of the Ministry of Agriculture (2013), see: http://www.paden-senegal.org. 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
Onion Carrot Cabbage Sweetpepper Eggplant AfricanEggplant Tomato
Are
a in
 hec
tare
s
PMP BASE
 Page 38  
 Figure B2: Calibration results (yields) 
Source: Authors  B3. Hydroeconomic model data  
Table B4: Parameter values for the hydro-economic models 
Parameter Value Data source Infiltration rate 0.4% Tine (2004) Elasticity of the demand function  -0.442 Our farm model Constant of the demand function  8196.4 Our farm model Discount rate 7.5% CNCAS Specific yield 0.15 Dasylva and Cosandey (2005)  Total irrigated area in the Niayes 10000 ha Faye et al. (2007) Aquifer lift 7m Sample data Water extraction from non-ag (water company and rural boreholes sector) 1374495m
3 Ministry of hydraulics and sanitation and the Senegalese water company  Area covered by the quaternary sand aquifer 2300 km2 Aguiar et al. (2010)   Source: Authors with data from literature 
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C. Historical and simulated rainfalls: a comparison 
Table C1: Simulated rainfalls 
Years Rainfalls in base scenario (mm) Rainfalls in dry scenario (mm) Rainfalls in wet scenario (mm) 1 163.3 209.225 462.35 
2 389.325 163.3 569.725 
3 318.05 209.225 479.925 
4 479.925 209.225 569.725 
5 259.85 166.225 471.65 
6 192.325 209.225 569.725 
7 318.05 163.3 439.975 
8 458.95 166.225 569.725 
9 439.975 182.725 458.95 
10 386.275 192.325 479.925 
    
Mean (mm) 340.6 187.1 507.17 
Coefficient of variation 0.322 0.112 0.108 Source: Authors  
 
Figure C1: Simulated rainfalls vs. Observed rainfalls  
Source: Authors  Table C2: Comparison of statistical characteristics of observed and simulated rainfall series  
Rainfall time series Mean (mm/year) Coefficient of variation Simulated rainfalls (42 years from 2012) 333.10 0.31 Observed rainfalls (1970-2011) 337.55 0.27 Source : Authors 
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